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for the defense of the nation. It will examine the Army's implementation of the Abrams doctrine and transition to a total force. It also examines the feasibility and challenges of maintaining the Army National Guard as an operational reserve and the implications of maintaining operational readiness. Finally, it will conclude with some insights into the way ahead for sustaining the Army National Guard as an operational force for the twenty-first century.
THE National Guard: An Operational Force for the 21st Century
The Guard has proven itself it really has to be the force of first choice, not a force of last resort, across many of our vital missions. And we can't return to viewing and utilizing the National Guard merely as a strategic reserve to be deployed only in the event of emergency. That means we have to continue to invest in training and equipment. We've got to work harder to incorporate the men and women of the Guard into ongoing military operations by judiciously utilizing their skills and their capabilities as part of our strategic total force. You've got to be part of that. 3 Of that number, the authorized end strength for all active components was approximately 1.5 million and a reserve component authorized end strength of almost 900 thousand, making the reserve component 37 percent of the total force. 4 For the Army this percentage is much higher.
In 2010 the active Army authorized end strength stood at 562,000 with the Army National Guard and Army Reserve totaling 563,000, making it 50 percent of the total Army force.
5
In framing the U.S. Constitution, the founding fathers granted Congress the power "to provide and maintain a Navy," but limited its power with respect to the Army by stipulating that it can "raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years." 6 In contrast, the Founders granted Congress the power to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions." 7 In lieu of a large standing army, the nation would purposefully rely on In 1899 because most of the regular Army was engaged in fighting in Cuba, three quarters of the first U.S. troops to fight in the Philippines were from the National Guard. 11 The Army sent in 100,000 Soldiers mostly from the National Guard and the rebellion collapsed in March 1901.
Federalization of the National Guard
The Johnson the necessary use of force to repel or prevent further attacks against U.S. To meet the requirements for additional combat forces, the Army had to increase its active strength from 960,000 in 1964 to nearly 1.5 million men by 1968. 27 It did this through a combination of voluntary enlistments, involuntary extensions, and ever increasing draft calls. President Johnson's failure to mobilize the Army National Guard and Reserve and the reliance on the draft caused critical operational and morale issues 7 for the Army. As the Army expanded to meet troop demands they were forced to rely heavily on draftees. New units were hastily built and leadership was in short supply. As a result, experience levels fell. 28 This hasty growth did not come without a price. Forty percent of officers and 70 percent of enlisted Soldiers had less than 2 years of service.
Discipline broke down, Soldiers refused to follow the orders of their officers, and the Army suffered from low morale.
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All men between the ages of 18 and 26 were eligible to be drafted. However, there were a variety of deferments, postponements, and exemptions available such as occupational, student enrollment, medical disqualification, or having children. brigades from other AC divisions. 43 As plans shifted from Operation Desert Shield and the defense of Saudi Arabia to Operation Desert Storm and offensive operations to recapture Kuwait from Iraq, the three Roundout maneuver brigades were eventually mobilized for active duty. This did not change the attitude of the AC component leadership towards using the Roundout maneuver brigades for Operation Desert Storm.
Cheney stated that "I want to be absolutely certain that units drawn from the Guard and
Reserve have the opportunity for the additional workup training our people think they require… before they go; they need to go to the National Training Center to get into shape as if they were an active duty division." 44 Ironically, none of the AC brigades chosen to replace the RC Roundout brigades were required to complete a National
Training Center rotation prior to deploying to Saudi Arabia. 45 Operation Desert Storm commenced on 17 January 1990 and ended on 28
February 1990. 46 As a result of the delay in mobilization, changing validation requirements, equipment issues, and the unwillingness of AC trainers and evaluators to certify the maneuver brigades as trained and ready, the three Roundout Brigades did not deploy to Saudi Arabia. By the end of offensive operations, the three Maneuver
Brigades had spent a total of three months conducting post mobilization training. During the course of this time, only one brigade was validated. Two National Guard Artillery Brigades activated at the same time as the three maneuver brigades did mobilize, complete post mobilization training in less than 60 days, and deploy to Saudi Arabia in time to participate in Operation Desert Storm. 47 The participation of RC units in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm was viewed as validation that the total force concept worked.
Transition to an Operational Force
Throughout the remainder of the 1990s and early 2000s, the National Guard continued to move toward transitioning from a strategic to an operational force. During 14 The Nation has been at a state of national emergency for nine and a half years. As a result, the Army has had continuous access to the reserve component through partial mobilization. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have performed magnificently, and the relationship between the components is better than it has ever been. Our Soldiers have fought together and bled together, and more than ever, we are one Army, a Total Force. Our Nation cannot lose the enormous gains we have made. 51 In The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed. 55 This statement indicates that while the RC will be sustained as an operational force, it will also be relied upon to continue to provide strategic depth. This will require careful management of dwindling resources and smaller force structure to ensure a balanced force capable of meeting the operational needs of today's persistent conflicts while maintaining the ability to respond to large scale total war of the past.
In many respects the RC is being used operationally today, it does not mean they are already a sustainable operational force. 56 While the transformation of the RC from a strategic force to a fully operational force happened out of necessity over the course of years, deliberate plans to transform the RC is a relatively recent initiative. The Commission came to the conclusion that for the foreseeable future, there is no reasonable alternative to the Nations reliance on reserve components as part of an operational force. 58 Since the final report, many of the CNGRs recommendations have been implemented; however, many CNGR proposals are very complex and will take years or decades to be implemented.
The systemic issues that have plagued RC transition from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve capable of rapid and sustained deployments can be categorized into the following areas: manning, equipping, and training.
Manning
The most difficult of these issues is Manning the force. In the past the RC forces were manned in a tiered level of readiness. Tiered readiness was an acceptable approach when the demand for operational forces allowed for rare deployments.
Under the tiered readiness approach, every unit had a required strength and an authorized strength. The required strength is the number of personnel required for the unit to be fully manned (100%). Authorized strength was the number of personnel that the unit was allowed to fill (always some number less than 100%). High priority RC units aligned with specific contingency plans had a higher authorized rate, usually 90%. Units with lower priority were commonly authorized an 80% fill rate. Regardless of a unit's authorized strength, under the strategic force concept, it was expected that units would have the necessary post mobilization time to fill the unit to its required strength.
Factors compounding this issue were Soldiers who did not meet the medical and dental requirements for deployment. Units would mobilize at the authorized rate of 80% to 90%. An initial Soldiers Readiness Process (SRP) conducted at the unit's home station would often identify between 10 and 25% of assigned Soldiers with medical or dental issues that prevented them from deploying. Upon arrival at the mobilization station, subsequent medical screening would often identify an additional 5% to 15% of the Soldier's required medical or dental treatment in order to meet deployment requirements. Between mobilization and deployment, a unit could lose 15% to 40% of its pre-deployment Soldiers to health and dental issues. The second and third order effects of this on the mobilization station were overwhelmed medical and dental progressive readiness and cyclical deployments. 65 The Army Force Generation model provided a new paradigm based on the concept of train, mobilize, and deploy in a continuous cyclic process. A properly synchronized ARFORGEN cycle will provide the predictability and stability necessary to resolve equipping and manning issues. A predictable training and deployment cycle will insure the maximum use of limited resources that contribute towards maintaining the Total RC as an operational force capable of simultaneous deployment with the AC while maintaining a strategic force capable of surging to meet the needs of a large scale war.
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Conclusion
Transitioning the Army from three distinct organizations to a total force with operational and strategic missions has been a long and arduous process which began in 1974 with the implementation of the total force doctrine and the shift to an all volunteer force. In the past 11 years, the RC has proven itself to be an essential part of the total force. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are concluded, budgets and end strength are scheduled to decline. Much must be done to do more with less in an ever increasing volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment.
As a result of the total force policy and force integration, AC and RC must now operate as one united force to fight our Nation's wars. While significant progress has been made in personnel policies, training, and equipping, more work is needed, especially in the areas of policies and funding. The concept of utilizing the RC as an operational reserve capable of deploying simultaneously with the AC is only feasible if properly equipped and funded. Insufficient funding will create a hollow force incapable of meeting the requirements of an operational reserve and will place the Nations security at risk.
The transition from the strategic reserve linear deployment model of mobilize, train, and deploy, to today's cyclic operational reserve model of train, mobilize, and deploy, was necessary to meet the operational needs of today's wars. In an age of persistent conflict, no one can predict with certainty what the next threat to the Nation will be. By utilizing the ARFORGEN model to manage RC force generation, up to 1/5 of National Guard force structure, nearly 71,000 Soldiers, will be immediately available for contingency operations with the remaining 4/5, over 280,000 Soldiers, available to provide strategic depth with a surge capability that is better manned, trained, and equipped than the strategic reserve of the cold war era.
The threat to the Nation has changed. While the possibility of fighting established standing armies of belligerent nation states still exists and must be planned for, it has proven far more likely that the Army will operate in an environment of persistent asymmetrical conflict against failed states and non-state actors. It is therefore imperative to the Nation's security that the National Guard and the RC as a whole, must continue to operate as an operational reserve, now, and into the 21st Century.
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